ABSTRACT Telecare medical information system (TMIS) is highly desirable to users by allowing them to remotely access medical services or medical information and security, such as authentication and privacy preserving of users is challenging. Recently, some smart card-based password authentication (two-factor authentication) schemes have been proposed. In this paper, we use Chaudhry et al.'s scheme as a case study and demonstrate that a family of two-factor authentication schemes for the TMIS are not secure against offline dictionary attack and fail to revoke the stolen/lost smart card. Furthermore, an improved two-factor authentication scheme with anonymity has been proposed to remedy the weakness of these schemes. The security analysis of the proposed solution is formally given with the random oracle model and Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of information technology, telecare medical information system (TMIS) [1] - [8] has become an available choice for patients to get remote health services conveniently. Telecare medical information systems have improved the health-care process between users (patients) and doctors by providing an efficient communicating platform on internet, which overcomes some drawbacks in traditional health-care services such as the barrier between patients and doctors caused by the inconvenience of patents' time and locations [5] . Besides, due to the limited resources on patients' medical history, doctors may find it difficult to decide the best medical treatment for them. Fortunately, these problems could be solved by TMIS. Firstly, health-care services could be available whenever and wherever because of the timely communication provided by TMIS. In this way, TMIS has abilities to break the barriers of location and time. Secondly, TMIS severs can record users private information and medical history in database, which is of great help for doctors to employ the best medical treatment for patients. The structure of TMIS is illuminated in Fig.1 .
In spite of these advantages, several challenges should be addressed before the TMIS can be adopted and deployed widely by the public. First, the TMIS is vulnerable to many known attacks because these systems are built on public network. Second, medical history and private information of users are supposed to be maintained carefully by TMIS sever and be concealed in messages transmitted among all entities to prevent users' privacy from being disclosed. To ensure the security of the TMIS, a secure mechanism is desirable to protect the communication process in TMIS. Remote authentication protocol is a promising way to protect users and severs from adversaries in various information systems. After the first authentication scheme [9] was proposed Xu et al. [29] designed a new authentication protocol to provide secure and reliable services in TMIS in 2014. Islam and Khan [30] pointed out the scheme in [29] was insecure and not efficient enough because of the following weaknesses: (1) It could not provide a correct password change service. ( 2) It could not provide the revocation of lost smart card. ( 3) It could not resist replay attack. (4) It could not verify user's password locally. Then they proposed a security enhanced scheme [30] . Unfortunately, Chaudhry et al. [31] found the scheme in [30] failed to resist user and sever impersonation attack. After that, they designed an improved protocol [31] . Almost simultaneously, Zhang and Zhu [32] pointed out the scheme in [30] fails to withstand other attacks: off-line dictionary attack, man-in-middle attack and replay attack. Then a new protocol is designed by them [32] to solve these problems. Actually all these schemes [29] - [32] are insecure against off-line dictionary attack because of two reasons: (1) In these schemes [30] - [32] , once adversary obtains the password verifier v i from user's smart card, adversary can check his guessing password easily by making use of v i . (2) In these schemes [29] , [31] , there is only one passwordrelated data that adversary cannot acquire to compute the login request message. Hence adversaries could verify his guessing password by making using of user's previous login message and data stored in user's smart card. Furthermore, we find all these schemes fail to provide valid revocation services. This paper use the scheme in [31] as a case study to indicate all these schemes [29] - [32] fail to resist off-line dictionary attack and provide valid smart card revocation services. Off-line dictionary attack resistance and card revocation services are basic security goals for two-factor authentication scheme to assure reliability for the whole information systems. Therefore, all two-factor authentication schemes must meet these security requirements. A detailed analysis of security flaws in these two-factor authentication protocols [29] - [32] is conducted and we intend to identify design flaws in [29] - [32] to make the same mistakes avoided in future designs. Then we propose a novel scheme to meet all security requirements.
We summarize the contribution of our work as follows:
• The scheme in [31] is used as a case study to indicate that all schemes in this family [29] - [32] are insecure against off-line dictionary attack and cannot provide valid smart card revocation services. The details of these flaws in [31] show in our paper. Then we observe other schemes [29] , [30] , [32] also have the same weaknesses.
• We propose a novel authentication scheme to overcome the security drawbacks. We have analyzed the basic reasons for these flaws so as to avoid the same security drawbacks. Furthermore, our new scheme is able to protect user's privacy by providing user anonymity.
• After being analyzed through the widely-accepted formal security model and BAN-logic, the novel protocol is strong enough to meet all security requirements. In addition, the informal security analyses are given in this VOLUME 5, 2017 paper to prove the security of the scheme. Furthermore, efficiency analysis shows the novel scheme is efficient to be applied in practice.
II. PRELIMINARY
This section introduces some important concepts needed in the rest of this paper.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE
Let y 2 = (x 3 + mx + n) mod p define a non-singular elliptic curve over finite field F p , where p is a prime and m, n ∈ F p meet (4m 3 + 27n 2 ) mod p = 0. Given a base point P and an integer t ∈ F p , the scalar point multiplication in this elliptic curve is defined as follows: nP = P + P + · · · + P(n times) [33] .
• Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) Problem:
Choosing a base point P ∈ F p and a integer a ∈ Z p , it is computationally infeasible to find a by making use of a · P [35] .
• Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) problem: Choosing a base point P ∈ F p and integers a, b ∈ Z p , without the knowledge of a or b, it is computationally infeasible to obtain a · b · P by only making use of a · P and b · P [35] .
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this subsection, we will discuss the attacker model to capture capabilities attackers could have. According to [36] , the adversary A is generally assumed to have the following abilities:
• A could either learn a user's password by using malicious card readers or extract all parameter from user's lost or stolen smart card with side-channel attack [37] , [38] , but A cannot achieve both.
• A could control the public communication channel fully.
• A could be a legal but malicious user in the information systems. Furthermore, there is another ability A could have as follows: it is reasonable to suppose that an attacker A could obtain specific user's identity once adversary has attained the user's smart card [39] , [40] . Firstly, user's identity is of little security strength [41] , which makes adversaries guess a specific user easily. Secondly, the user's ID can be attained from user's personal information and other public resources of the user. Thirdly, users are accustomed to keeping passwords secret while they may not be accustomed to keeping their identities as secret as password [42] ,which means it is easy for adversaries to acquire a specific user's ID. In general, considering user's ID to protect users' privacy is meaningless password is the only factor to protect two-factor authentication.
C. FORMAL SECURITY MODEL
In order to capture the security goals of two-factor authentication protocols accurately, we introduce the formal modified security model [43] based on BPR2000 security model [44] .
Players: There are two participants in the protocol P: a user U i ∈ User and a sever S j ∈ Sever. Each one has a couple of instances called oracles involved in executions of P. We define every instance in P as I , so I ∈ User ∪ Sever.
Queries: The only way for adversary A to interact with participants in P is to make use of oracle queries, which simulates adversaries' abilities in the real world. There are several kinds of quires described as follows:
• Create(U i ): Challenger C sets the new participant U i and creates U i 's secret factors.
• Execute( n i,j ): This query is to imitate eavesdropping attacks. After receiving this query, C responds messages exchanged between participants in P.
• Reveal( n i,j ): This query responds the session key of previous session participants required by A. This query is to meet the requirement that the disclosure of previous session keys cannot make unrevealed sessions disclosed.
• Send(U i , M ): Upon receiving a message M from A, C responds the result on the basis of P. A can start a special query, say Send(U i ,start), which makes U i start a session with server.
• Corrupt(U i ): In this security model, adversary A is able to break only one of the user's factors: user's password PW i or security parameters stored in SC i .
• Test( n i,j ): This query is to define session key's semantic security. A asks for a Test query for the unrevealed oracle n i,j . After that, C flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and responds the right session key, if b = 1. Else C outputs a random key with the same size. This query is supposed to be executed only once during the execution.
The above queries define the real abilities of adversaries exactly and the security model help capture the real malicious attacks, e.g, impersonation attacks, off-line dictionary attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, and passive eavesdropping.
The basic purpose of authentication protocols is to protect the valid session key from adversaries. In a run of P, A could execute Execute, Send, Reveal, Corrupt queries for several times and Test queries for one time to output his guess of the b . If b = b, A wins the game. Hence the advantage of A to violet protocol P is defined as follows: This section reviews the authentication protocol in [31] (as shown in Fig. 2 ). This protocol is made up of the following phases and the notations involved in Chaudhry et al's scheme is listed in 
in card by S. S sends the card to U i over a secret channel.
Step3 After receiving his card, U i stores r i in his card.
Eventually
3) LOG IN AND VERIFICATION PHASE
Step1 When U i intends to login, he inserts his card into the special card reader and then enters ID i and
is compared to the existing parameter v i . SC quits the login request if v * i is not equal to v i . Otherwise SC selects a nonce a i ∈ Z * p and a timestamp T 1 and computes:
Step2 After receiving U i 's message m i , S checks the validity of timestamp T 1 . S quits the login request if the timestamp T 1 is invalid. Otherwise S computes: 
s is not equal to V s , otherwise S is verified by U i successfully and U i accepts SK as session key with S.
4) PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
In this protocol, U i is able to update his password locally.
Step1 U i insert his card into the special reader and then inputs his current ID i and 
5) STOLEN/LOST CARD REVOCATION PHASE
We notice in [31] , authors skip this phase, which is designed in [30] . Chaudhry et al. also maintain the data n i used for revocation phase in their scheme, so their scheme also has the revocation phase as follow:
Step1 U i inputs his identity ID i . Then U i chooses a new password PW * i and random number r
and sends {ID i , w * i } to S over a secure channel. Step2 After receiving {ID i , w * i }, S firstly checks the credentials of U i , e.g. ID-card or passport. Then S computes n * i = n i + 1 and update (ID i , n * i ) in database. After that, S chooses a random numbers r * s ∈ Z * p and computes α * = 
B. CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section, we will demonstrate this scheme in [31] fails to withstand off-line dictionary attack and cannot provide valid revocation services for lost smart card. The same weaknesses in [29] , [30] , and [32] are also discussed in this section. 
1) OFF-LINE DICTIONARY ATTACK 1
This subsection shows that a malicious user is able to complete off-line dictionary attack successfully with U i 's identity and personal parameter. Adversary A could run the following steps to complete off-line dictionary attack.
Step1 
A obtains U i 's card by some means and use side channel attack to extract user U i 's data [39] , most users are accustomed to choosing a relatively weak password. Thus the password space of a specific user is restricted, e.g., |D PW | ≤ 10 6 [45] . The time complexity of this attack is 2T h , where T h is operating time of one-way hash function. According to the experimental data in [39] , an adversary could finish this attack in seconds with a common PC. According to [39] , even if the adversary A couldn't get the user U i 's identity, A can finish this work easily by guessing the user U i 's ID i and PW i at the same time. In general, an adversary could complete the off-line dictionary attack successfully with user's smart card.
Similarly, the scheme in [30] also fails to resist off-line dictionary attack because of the same password verifier parameter v i = h(s · P w i ) as the scheme in [31] . Moreover, the adversary is able to obtain U i 's ID i directly from the message transmitting between users and severs as analyzed in [31] and [32] . Hence adversary is able to complete off-line dictionary attack if he obtains user's user's password verifier parameter v i from user U i 's smart card. The scheme in [32] also fails to withstand off-line dictionary attack. In [32] , the local password verifier v i = h(h(PW i r) ID i ) is simpler than v i in [30] and [31] . An adversary A even don't need to calculate the public data s · P like [30] , [31] 
In [32] , they claimed an adversary cannot complete password guessing attack because guessing user's identity and password simultaneously is impossible. However, their claim seems unconvincing as follow reasons: Firstly, as we discussed in section 2, A could somehow attain user's identity. Secondly, it is not reasonable to assume the spaces of user's identity and password are as large as they claimed, because if it was true, users must use the completely random ID and PW, which seems impossible because users cannot remember them for a long time. If users use completely random ID and PW, they may write their ID and PW on other objects directly to help them to remember, which will cause other security problems. In conclusion, an adversary A could complete the off-line dictionary attack successfully in [30] - [32] .
2) OFF-LINE DICTIONARY ATTACK 2
This subsection shows a malicious user can guess the user's password successfully by making use of personal data from user U i 's smart card and previous login request message of U i . The attacker A could run the following steps to complete this attack. Hence a malicious user can complete the off-line dictionary attack by making use of the U i 's private data and U i 's previous login message. We have analyzed in subsection ''Off-line dictionary attack 1'' to prove an adversary has abilities to complete off-line dictionary attack within reasonable time.
Similarly, the scheme in [29] also fails to resist off-line dictionary attack because of the same structural mistake as [31] .
3) FAILING TO PROVIDE VALID REVOCATION OF STOLEN/LOST SMART CARD
When users lose their smart card, they could re-register to the TMIS sever. Then they will get a new card whereas the critical parameter h(ID s) cannot be updated. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a valid smart card revocation service for users. However, all the schemes [29] - [32] in this family fail to achieve this goal.
In [31] , when user finds their smart card was lost or stolen, he will re-register to TMIS sever. Then he will get a new smart card storing
after performing the off-line dictionary attack, an adversary A could impersonate himself as user U i successfully by making use of data from U i 's lost smart card as follow step:
i easily by computing n * i = n i + 1, A is able to calculate a valid log-in message of user U i . Hence when TMIS sever S received the log-in request from A, S cannot distinguish this request from U i or A. In summary, even if the lost smart card has been revoked by user U i , the adversary still can use the data from the revoked card to compute a valid log-in message of U i .
Similarly, schemes in [30] and [32] also have this weakness because they design the revocation phase of lost smart card with the same method as the scheme in [31] . We have pointed out that an adversary could impersonate himself as user U i by using the old data from U i 's lost smart card. Hence the revocation services of these schemes [30] - [32] are invalid.
IV. THE IMPROVED SCHEME
The significant design flaws of Chaudhry et al's scheme and our improvement are described as follows:
1) There is a local password verifying data v i stored in user's card. However, once adversary A has obtained v i , A can check the validity of his guessing password easily. We follow Wang et al's work [46] to design the local password verifier v i , which will make adversaries cannot verify their guessing password. 2) The user's previous login message data V i can be used to verify the attacker's guessing password. We change the constitution of V i to overcome this weakness. Random number a i and ECC algorithm are used to protect V i . Hence adversaries cannot complete off-line dictionary attack because they cannot attain the user's random number a i or sever's private key s to compute a valid V * i . 3) There is a data n i which is used for providing card revocation services. However, the updated value of n i can be calculated by adversary A easily with old value of n i . Hence the revocation phase of the scheme is invalid. In our scheme, n i is replaced by a random number chosen by sever S and it is used to compute h(ID i s n i ).
The secret value h(ID i s n i ) shared between users and sever will be updated when user re-register to the TMIS sever, so adversaries cannot impersonate themselves as users by making use of invalid smart card. The proposed scheme consists the following five phases (as shown in Fig. 3 ) and the notations involved in our scheme is listed in Table 2 . 
C. LOG IN AND VERIFICATION PHASE
Step1 When U i is going to login, firstly he inserts his card into the special reader and inputes his ID i and PW i . After that, SC counts r i = R i h(ID i PW i ), 
, p} in card. Step3 S sends the card to U i through secret channel.
Upon receiving card,
where n is a medium integer, 2 8 ≤ n ≤ 2 16 [46] . 
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEMES A. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we show the proposed protocol is secure in the formal security model. The following analysis is based on the fact that ECDH problem is computationally infeasible to be solved.
1) SIMULATIONS OF QUERIES IN THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL a: SIMULATION OF HASH ORACLE QUERIES
C firstly keeps an empty hash list L h , which keeps {x, y} tuples, where y = h(x). C responds A's queries as follows:
• C searches for {x, y} in L h and outputs y if this tuple exist in L h .
• Otherwise, C chooses a number y ∈ Z * p if {x, y} doesn't exist in L h . Then C responds y to A. Eventually C adds the new value of x, y into L h .
b: SIMULATION OF SEND QUERIES
Suppose that U i is in the prospective state, for a Send(U i , start) query, the response from U i is as follows:
• Selects a nonce a i ∈ Z * p and a timestamp T 1 . Then calculates:
Suppose that S j is in the prospective state, for a Send(S j , {PID i , A i , V i , T 1 }) query, the answers from S j is as follows:
Checks the validity of timestamp T 1 . Calculates
• 
• Otherwise m s = {A s , V s , T 2 } is accepted. Eventually, U i and S j are accepted by each other and then they aborts the session.
c: SIMULATION OF EXECUTE QUERIES
The Execute query is simulated with the Send query as follows: VOLUME 5, 2017
d: SIMULATION OF CORRUPT QUERIES
The Corrupt query is simulated as follows:
• If a=1, responds U i 's password.
• Otherwise it responds U i 's secret parameters stored in smart card.
e: SIMULATION OF REVEAL QUERIES
The Reveal query is simulated as follows:
• If n i,j accept, it responds SK between n i,j and its partner.
• Otherwise it responds a null value.
f: SIMULATION OF TEST QUERIES
The Test query is simulated as follows:
It flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}.
• It responds the right session key, if b = 1.
• Else it outputs a random key with the same size.
2) THEOREM AND PROOF

Theorem 1:
Suppose that A is able to ask q send times Send queries, q exe times Execute queries and q h times Hash queries to breach the semantic security of the proposed authentication protocol. Let l denote the security length and |D| denote the password space. Hence, we attain:
|D| . Proof: C gets (a · P, b · P) and intends to calculate a · b · P by making using of PPT turing machine A. The hash function H in P is utilized as a random oracle by C. At the beginning, C maintains an empty H -list. In this proof, the sequence of games are defined as G i and for each G i , we define Suc i which means A obtain b successfully in the Test query. Game G 2 : This game is simulated as previous games while it will be halted under the following conditions:
• Collisions on the results of hash queries. According to the birthday paradox, the probabilities of the above collisions are ( 
Game G 4 : This game is simulated under the condition that
A may guess the parameter h(ID i s n i ) successfully without executing the related queries. Firstly we define a parameter to simulate this game: k = h(ID i s n i ).
• U i : Search for (ID i * * , k) in L h . We terminate this game if this record does not exist. Else calculate
• S: Calculates V * i = h(ID i k a i · s · P T 1 ) and checks the validity of received V i . If V i is verified successfully, S search for (PID i , A i , V i , T 1 ) in send list. If such a query does not be found, we terminate this game. This game will succeed only if the parameter k has been guessed by A successfully without asking Hash queries. Hence we attain:
This game is designed to simulate ECDH problem. Firstly, we supplant some parameters in our protocol as follows to make the security of the protocol depends on the ECDH problem solely:
• U i : Selects a nonce a i ∈ Z * p and T 1 . Then calculates:
• S: Chooses a s ∈ Z * p and T 2 . |D| . By uniting all the equations listed above, we obtain the result showed in the beginning of this subsection.
B. VERIFICATION OF AUTHENTICATION SCHEME THROUGH BAN-LOGIC
BAN-logic [47] is one of the widely accepted formal models for information exchange protocols. We analyze the novel authentication protocol through BAN-logic. Some important signs of and logical postulates are described as follows:
• S |≡ X : S believes X.
• S ⇒ X : S has jurisdiction over X.
• S X : S has seen X.
• S |∼ X : S said X.
• (X ): X is fresh.
• (X,Y): X or Y is a part of (X,Y).
• < X > Y : X is combined with Y.
• S k ←→ T : S and T share key k for communication.
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• SK: A session key.
• Message-meaning rule:
• Freshness rule:
• Nonce-verification rule:
• Jurisdiction rule:
We list the two messages exchanged between U i and S:
We idealize forms of the proposed scheme:
We list security goals of the protocol:
We list the assumptions of the proposed scheme:
Obviously, the assumption of A.1 and A.2 are revealed by the protocol system. The assumption of A.3 and A.4 mean that TMIS sever S believes the freshness of timestamp T 1 chosen by user U i and U i believes the freshness of timestamp T 2 chosen by S. Assumption A.5 states that the sever S believes U i controls the statement (ID i , A i , T 1 , a i · s · P). Assumption A.6 states that the user U i believes S controls the statement (T 2 , A s , A si ).
The analysis of our scheme through BAN-logic is described as follow:
According to the message m i , we attain:
According to the jurisdiction rule, we attain:
This subsection shows the novel scheme is able to achieve all security goals and withstand various malicious attacks. The comparison in terms of security properties between our scheme and related work [29] - [31] has been given in Table 3 . 
2) USER ANONYMITY
In user's login phase, one-time used pseudo identity PID i is sent to S instead of user's ID i . It is impossible to reveal user's identity from PID i without sever S's private key s. Therefore, attacker A cannot get ID i only by getting the pseudo identity PID i . Hence the novel protocol has abilities to provide strong user anonymity.
3) REPLAY ATTACK
The timestamp T n is used to ensure the freshness of the message sent between user U i and sever S, and the timestamp is combined with the secret parameter shared between user and sever by hash function. Hence attacker A cannot construct a valid message by using the old message to perform attacks. Furthermore, U i 's pseudo identity PID i is different in different login request, because user use different random number a i to compute the pseudo identity PID i . If adversary wants to generate a valid message, he needs to know the random number a i and h (ID i s n i ) . However, attacker cannot VOLUME 5, 2017 get them. Hence our scheme has abilities to withstand replay attack.
4) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Once adversary A intends to launch user or sever impersonation attack, he must compute the valid value of h(ID i s n i ). There are two ways for A to achieve his goal: (1) A needs know the secret key s of TMIS sever to compute h(ID i s n i ).
It requires A to get user U i 's password PW i . Actually, both sever S's secret key s and user U i 's password PW i cannot be attained by attacker A. Thus the improved protocol can resist impersonation attack.
5) MAN-IN-MIDDLE ATTACK
If A intends to accomplish man-in-middle attack, he needs to be authenticated by both user U i and TMIS sever S. However, A cannot be authenticated by TMIS sever without the validity of user U i 's password and A cannot be authenticated by user U i without the sever S's secret key s. Hence the improved scheme can withstand man-in-middle attack.
6) OFF-LINE DICTIONARY ATTACK
The password verifier v i = h((s · P w i ) (mod n)) cannot be computed by the attacker A because the random number r i is protected by U i 's identity and password. Furthermore, there are many pairs of user's {ID * i , PW * i } that could attain the same value of password verifier v i , which makes A cannot check the validity of his guessing password. On the other hand, adversary A cannot complete off-line dictionary attack by making using of the user U i 's previous login message because he don't know the validity of the random number a i or sever's secret key s. Hence he cannot compute a valid
. Therefore, the improved scheme can withstand off-line dictionary attack.
7) PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
In the proposed scheme, no password-related parameters are stored in sever's database, so a privileged adversary A cannot get the user U i 's password by using the data stored in sever's database. Moreover, in the registration process, user's password is protected by random number r i chosen by the user. Hence our scheme has abilities to withstand privileged insider attack.
D. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
The novel protocol is compared with existing protocols [29] - [31] in communication cost, computation cost and storage overhead.
1) COMPUTATION COST
Firstly, we introduce the following notations used in the computation cost analysis.
• T m Time spent in completing a point multiplication in ECC. • T i Time spent in completing a modular inversion operation.
• T h Time spent in completing a hash operation. We follow the experimental data in [48] and [49] to compare the novel protocol with relevant protocols [29] - [31] in computation cost. In the user side T m requires 130 ms for one time; T i requires 30 ms for one time; T h requires 1 ms for one time. Correspondingly, in the sever side the computation cost of these operations are 1.17 ms, 0.3 ms and 0.01 ms (as shown in Fig. 5 ). In Table. 4, we summarize the computation cost of the novel protocol with existing scheme [29] - [31] . Compared with the most recent scheme in [31] : at the user side, the novel scheme saves much computation costs by improving the algorithm in the login request (as shown in Fig. 4) . 
2) COMMUNICATION COST AND MEMORY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
We summarize the length of data transmitted between user and sever, the memory requirement of smart card to contain the security parameters. We assume that identity digest of the hash function and timestamps have the same length of 160 bits, and the parameter n which is used in the modular arithmetic has the length of 16 bits.
The novel scheme needs the same communication costs as relevant schemes (as shown in Fig. 6 ). In the login phase, user sends m i = {PID i , A i , V i , T 1 } to TMIS sever. According to our assumption, the cost of this message is 4 × 160 = 640 bits. TMIS sever S sends the message m s = {A s , V s , T 2 } to user, which costs 3 × 160 = 480 bits. In the scheme of [29] , card contains {P, Y , B, r, p}, which requires 160 × 5 = 800 bits. In the scheme of [30] , card contains {P, v, Y , r, α, p}, which requires 160×6 = 960 bits. In the scheme of [31] , card contains {P, v, Y , r, α, p, O}, which requires 160 × 7 = 1120 bits. In the proposed scheme, card contains {P, v i , R i , s · P, p, O i , n}, which requires 160 × 5 + 16 × 2 = 832 bits. Compared with the scheme in [31] , we add a parameter n while we remove some insignificant parameters from user's card to save the storage costs (as shown in Fig. 7) . The comparison in terms of communication and storage overhead between our scheme and related work is given in Table 5 .
VI. CONCLUSION
The authentication scheme in [31] is used as a case study to indicate all the schemes [29] - [32] in this family fail to withstand off-line dictionary attack and provide valid card revocation services. Then we propose a novel scheme in this paper. After completing the security and verification analyses, we prove that the new scheme is able to meet all security requirements. Compared with the most relevant scheme [31] , we have improved both reliability and performance efficiency of the authentication protocol. Hence we are able to conclude that the novel scheme is more reliable and efficient to be applied in TMIS. 
